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This  paper  provides  an  overview  of  how  the  major  airports  are  regulated  in 
Europe. In order to eliminate the potential of airports to exercise market power 
and  protect  the  public  interest,  it  has  become  increasingly  necessary  to  set  a 
common  regulatory  framework.  We  intend  to  discuss  the  need  of  a  single 
regulator in Europe to monitor or establish the quality of service and the charges 
practiced  by  the  airports,  to  ensure  cost-relatedness,  transparency  and  non-
discrimination. The existing regulatory approaches regarding aeronautical charges 
and their economic implications are also analyzed. We propose the creation of a 
European Observatory for this sector. 
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1.  THE NEED FOR AIRPORTS REGULATION 
The economic regulation of infrastructure services arises from the necessity of 
correcting  market  failures  that  take  place  when  there  is  no  competitive 
environment,  such  as  the  case  of  the  natural  monopoly,  or  when  there  is 
competition  without  fulfilling  the  required  conditions.  These  circumstances 
sometimes  lead  to  infrastructure  misuse  by  the  operators  that  provide  an 
inefficient  service  with  high  prices  and  poor  quality.  Thus,  the  presence  of  a 
visible hand (regulation) is fundamental for the stakeholders’ protection. Airports 
have several characteristics that call for regulation, particularly their monopolistic 
features with high economies of scale, scope and density, asymmetric information 
(moral hazard and adverse selection), very high and long-lived (sunk) assets and 
externalities (negative and positive). 
Airports provide both aeronautical services (infrastructure, facilities and ground 
handling  services)  and  non-aeronautical  services  (as  car  parks  or  retail 
concessions)  to  two  main  groups  of  customers:  airlines  and  air  travelers.  The 
demand of these services is complementary, with complex relations and in order 
to  attract  air  travelers  airports  have  to  attract  air  carriers  in  the  first  place. 
Furthermore, due to their complementary nature, the lack of competition in airport 
services can distort competition between airlines. Airports often have too much 
market  power  even  when  there  is  potential  for  competition  (e.g.  in  ground 
handling services). Their market power depends on the  airline’s ability to use 
another  airport  and  on  the  travelers’  choice  of  other  transportation.  Starkie 
discusses the sources of airports’ market power in relation to their aeronautical 
charges  and  concludes  that  the  market  power  of  an  airport  “is  likely  to  vary 
between  different,  and  possibly  fairly  narrow,  segments  of  the  air  transport 
market” (Starkie, 2002). He also argues that an airport is likely to have more 
market power in relation to networked airline services where economies of scale 
and scope are pronounced than in relation to low-cost carriers, point-to-point and 
inclusive tour charter market.  In general, inter-airport competition appears to be                         3 
limited (Starkie, 2002).
1 The introduction of competition between terminals, i.e., 
terminals under different operators, could be pointed as a possible remedy for this 
situation.  Nevertheless,  there  are  few  examples  of  intra-airport  competition.
2 
Besides Starkie claims that airports would not have incentives to explore their 
market power raising airport charges, as it would reduce not only demand for 
flights, but also for commercial services and thus airport’ revenues (Starkie, 2001, 
2002). According to the same author reasoning an airport regulator might not be 
necessary. We disagree because there are high levels of inefficiency, poor quality 
of  service,  discriminatory  procedures  and  lack  of  transparency  in  these  public 
services. However, all European airports face some degree of regulation and fully 
liberalized airports do not exist in the world. 
Economic regulation encompasses a wide range of motivations, depending on the 
country and sector regulated. Accordingly, the regulation objectives of airports are 
different from those of seaports, railways, water and electricity services. Likewise, 
the regulation of these services is certainly different in France, the UK, Germany, 
Australia, Portugal or other country. If it is clear that the infrastructures specificity 
determines the kind of regulation adopted, the same is not true for its variation 
from country to country, mainly in Europe where there are joint goals to build a 
common  market.  Nonetheless,  both  the  aims  and  the  regulation  itself,  besides 
being subject to the sector’s tradition and evolution, peculiar to each country, also 
depend on the stakeholders’ behavior, principally on the Government, which is 
the most volatile one. Governments intend, above all, to reduce the costs for the 
users and maximize their own rents (rent seeking), whereas the regulator and the 
operators favor the efficiency and innovation. The paths available and chosen, 
consistent with the legal framework of each country, as well as the incompatibility 
of  some  objectives,  put  forward  the  different  regulatory  processes.  Airport 
ownership is, most of the times, in the hands of the public sector (State or local 
level)  and  it  is  often  dominated  by  the  flag  airline.  So,  the  airport  industry 
                                                 
1 Even when there are several airports into the same catchment area they are frequently under the 
same ownership. In London, for example, the airports of Heathrow, Stansted and Gatwick are 
owned by British Airport Authority (BAA). A recent study of the Office of Fair Trading shows 
that competition between these airports is very low (OFT, 2006). 
2  New  York’s  John  F.  Kennedy  International  Airport,  Perth  and  Toronto  airports  are  three 
examples of competition within the same airport.                         4 
frequently faces several State failures sometimes more serious than the market 
failures associated with the monopoly power. The main objectives of economic 
regulation,  similar  to  those  of  other  public  services  (Marques,  2005),  are  the 
following: a) efficiency promotion (productive and allocative); b) protection of 
users interests (e. g. equity, quality of service, security and reliability); c) self-
financing  (whenever  possible);  d)  stable  policies;  and  e)  fostering  competition 
under equal conditions.  
The structure of this article is as follows. After this introduction we provide an 
overview of the regulatory issues in relation to European airports including the 
regulatory  governance  of  airports,  a  review  of  the  major  economic  regulation 
methods and a discussion of single/dual till approach. Next, the main problems of 
airport regulation are analyzed. Then, we discuss the benefits and drawbacks of a 
single regulator for Europe and finally, some concluding remarks are presented. 
 
2. AIRPORTS REGULATION IN EUROPE 
2.1 Regulatory governance 
The  institutional  framework  of  a  regulatory  system  is  associated  with  the 
infrastructure  services  ownership.  The  possible  structures  of  these  services 
comprise  the  private  activity  specially  regulated,  their  concession  to  private 
companies under public control and their management by the Government. All 
these  formulae  have  different  interpretations,  according  to  the  ideological, 
political and legal contexts of each country. For example, as far as airport services 
are concerned, England (BAA) shows predominance of the first situation, Greece 
(Athens)  of  the  second  and  Spain  of  the  third.  The  institutional  design  of  the 
regulatory systems depends, at large, on the referred configuration. Hence, the 
regulatory  functions  can  be  developed  by  different  players  which  include  the 
Government  (Ministries,  Departments,…),  regulatory  authorities  with  little 
independence (public institutes) and independent regulatory authorities. 
Generally, when infrastructure services ownership are publicly owned, regulation 
is  directly  guaranteed  by  the  Government.  In  this  case,  opacity  is  the  main 
characteristic of the regulatory system (Stern and Holder, 1999), as the activities                         5 
of establishment of rules, operation and regulation are all performed by the same 
entity. This reflects a political interference in regulation and consequently in the 
users’  charges.  When  the  sector’s  operation  is  subject  to  direct  State 
administration, it generally has the following characteristics: a) works in a little 
commercial or even non-commercial basis; b) only seems concerned in getting 
positive results rather than in being efficient; and c) subsidizes only some of the 
users. This scenario has been leading to a trend towards regulation by independent 
authorities, even when the private sector presence is irrelevant or non-existent (e. 
g. in Ireland and the Netherlands). 
In countries where private participation is significant, regulation should always be 
carried out by independent authorities.
3 This provides credibility and commitment 
to  regulation  and  avoids  the  arbitrary  interference  of  politicians.  The 
independence of regulation enables benefits (Marques, 2005), such as impartiality 
in decision making, flexibility of regulatory processes, expertise of the regulatory 
agency, credibility of the regulator, financial accountability and promotion and 
mediation  of  conflicts  resolution.  The  lack  of  accountability,  the  high  cost  of 
regulation,  the  difficulty  of  regulators’  effective  independence,  the  regulation 
methods ambiguity, the loss of sovereignty and the conflicts with other powers are 
pointed out as disadvantages of independent regulation.  
It  is  often  said  that  tight  contracts  (e.  g.  concession  contracts)  can  replace 
independent  regulation  (Demsetz,  1968).  We  think,  like  other  authors 
(Williamson, 1985), that this argument is not valid since it is not possible to have 
long-run, definite and complete contracts that comprehend all the contingencies 
and that can be invulnerable to an ex post opportunism. They will be serious but 
incomplete, at their best. So, contractual regulation is not an alternative by itself to 
regulation by an external authority.  
The existence of independent regulatory authorities is usually defended as non-
compulsory, as their competences are included in the functions of the transversal 
agencies responsible for the competition regulation. Regulation can be a result of 
                                                 
3 Notice that the importance of the private sector in airport industry is increasing. So far there are 
11 countries in the EU (25) with private sector participation in the provision of airport services and 
6 more announced the intention to privatise these services soon.                          6 
the agreement between the operator (airport) and the users (airlines) supervised by 
the  competition  authority.  This  “light-handed”  regulatory  process,  which 
originated  in  New  Zealand,  in  the  1980s,  is  based  on  three  main  principles, 
specifically the sectors restructuring with separation of the competitive elements 
from the non-competitive ones, the presence of an agency that fully assures the 
competition mechanisms and the disclosure of the main management information 
by the incumbent (Allport, 2000). Although this solution is sometimes adopted 
(e.g. New Zealand’s airports regulation), it frequently leads to a weak and not 
very  encompassing  regulatory  process.
4  Other  countries  defend  that  ex  post 
regulation  is  much  more  rigorous  than  ex  ante  regulation  (carried  out  by  a 
regulatory agency) and that the latter should be triggered by a court of law (or by 
a regulatory agency) when necessary (e.g. Australian airports regulation).
5 This 
process can raise some practical difficulties and it is a kind of regulation. More 
and  more  self-regulation  is  being  defended  as  a  better  solution  than  hetero-
regulation.  This  mechanism  leads  to  several  benefits,  including  the  resources 
saving and the dismissal of political accountability. However, despite its success 
in some sectors, it does not seem to be a convincing choice for airports regulation, 
mainly due to their reduced number of players. Finally, particularly in the USA, in 
the energy, telecommunications and air space sectors, deregulation is advocated in 
opposition to regulation, underlining that a free market environment enables more 
benefits.  Nevertheless,  deregulation  is  not  a  hypothesis  for  the  economic 




                                                 
4  The  success  of  this  light-handed  regulatory  process  is  not  very  clear.  The  Commerce 
Commission concluded in 2002 that in the New Zealand airports, the Auckland one should be 
regulated.  
5  In  the  middle  of  2002  the  Australian  airports  regulation  based  on  price  cap  regulation  was 
replaced by price monitoring. Although in such a way the charges are not established ex-ante, we 
can not state that there is not economic regulation in airports in Australia. What happened was that 
a tighter process of regulation as a result of several circumstances (e. g. September 11
th and Ansett 
airline  bankruptcy)  was  replaced  by  a  milder  one  (see,  about  Australian  airports  regulation, 
Forsyth, 2004).                            7 
2.2 Regulatory method  
There are several economic regulation methods at work. It is not easy to find 
consensus in their classification, but they can be sorted into two main groups, 
according  to  the  incentives  they  offer  the  regulated  industries  towards  costs 
minimization. The first group, with a very low degree of incentive, includes the 
rate  of  return  regulation  (henceforth,  RoR),  whereas  the  second,  with  a  high 
degree, corresponds to the incentive regulation. The remaining regulation methods 
are variations or interactions between these two classes, such as the well-known 
sliding scale approach, in which the costs and revenues (profits) are shared among 
stakeholders.   
 
 
2.2.1 Rate of return regulation (RoR) 
RoR (also called cost based regulation) allows for the establishment of a rate of 
return  upon  the  investment  made  (or  assets)  with  the  regulatory  authority’s 
approval.
6 Despite being widely used, RoR is highly criticized since it does not 
encourage  efficiency  and  innovation.  This  regulation  method  also  implies  that 
when the rate of return is higher than the capital cost over-investment is possible 
to occur without any technical reason, as the regulated operator gets an additional 
profit  for  each  supplementary  capital  unit  spent  (Averch  and  Johnson  effect). 
Likewise, it also fosters the gold plating practices. Airports do not have incentive 
to establish an efficient price structure and can manipulate the accountancy results 
when providing other non-regulated services. Finally, RoR needs a great amount 
of information, leading to high costs and to the regulator’s possible capture. The 
Netherlands, Spain and Portugal, for example, use this regulatory method in their 




                                                 
6 The term cost based regulation is less precise because to any regulatory process will always 
correspond a rate of return.                         8 
2.2.2 Incentive regulation 
Efficiency  and  innovation  are  the  main  aims  of  the  regulated  industries  when 
incentive regulation schemes are adopted. With these regulatory methods, despite 
assuming higher risks, the operators can have higher earnings. The pioneers of 
incentive regulation were the Professors Littlechild and Beesley, in 1980s, in the 
UK,  when  the  British  Telecom  privatization  occurred.  This  kind  of  regulation 
comprises  different  methods  such  as  price  cap  regulation  (hereafter,  PCR), 
revenue cap regulation, hybrid and yardstick competition methods.   
PCR consists on the imposition of an average maximum threshold for the charges 
of  the  services  provided.  With  the  prices  (charges)  ceilings  defined  at  the 
beginning  of  each  regulatory  period,  the  regulated  services  hold  the  earnings 
corresponding to the cost reduction which happens during that period. Therefore, 
the operators are encouraged to promote efficiency and innovation. At the end of 
each period the benefits coming from costs minimization are transferred to the 
users through a charge reduction in the next period. As PCR is not based on costs 
it  fosters  appropriate  price  structures,  maximizing  the  welfare.  The  price  cap 
formula is composed by two parts (CPI-X), one corresponding to the consumer 
price index (CPI), and the other (X) to the operator productivity change expected. 
Sometimes, an extra factor that accommodates unpredictable situations or some 
types of costs (exogenous or grounded in specific aims) which pass directly to the 
users  is  added  to  the  formula  CPI-X.
7  A  problem  that  is  raised  concerns  the 
regulatory period. Although, generally, this period is long (3 to 8 years), there is 
no  reason  for  the  non-existence  of  a  revision  in-between,  due  to  market  or 
political pressures or both, usually as a result of the excessive profits attained. In 
spite of reducing the risk, this situation prevents the efficiency improvement and 
puts the PCR in closeness to the RoR. Service quality is another essential issue in 
PCR. One of the operators’ main goals is the cost reduction to increase the profits. 
This is only possible if productivity growth or a reduction in the quality of service 
occurs. As there is no real competition, it is likely that the second hypothesis 
                                                 
7 The absence of this extra parameter was one of the major reasons for the failure of PCR in 
Australian airports regulation. The profit volatility in the PCR due to exogenous factors should 
have been avoided. There should have been an appropriate risk sharing between operator and 
users.                         9 
comes to work if not prevented. PCR might cause underinvestment, depending the 
investment decision on the credibility of regulation to allow for a fair return on 
investment. As a final point, it is important to stress that, in opposition to what 
was thought at first (Cabral and Riordan, 1989), this regulatory process also leads 
to significant costs, both for the regulatory authority and the regulated operators.
8 
PCR  is  being  used  in  Sweden,  Austria,  Malta  and  Denmark  among  other 
countries. 
Instead of prices, in revenue cap regulation, the airports revenues are limited to an 
average  maximum  value.  In  this  regulatory  method  the  operator  has  more 
autonomy to establish new tariffs, since the control is on all the revenues and not 
on the partial parts or on its structure. It brings more benefits when the fixed cost 
part is high and where demand side management (e.g. energy sector) is crucial. 
Often, the cap measure adopted is the revenue per passenger. Ireland, for instance, 
employs this regulatory method.  
One other regulatory approach is the yardstick competition method. It is based on 
the comparison of performance between operators of the same sector. Its major 
advantage  is  to  offer  the  operators  strong  incentives  towards  efficiency  and 
innovation,  fostering  the  sharing  and  transparency  of  information.  The  main 
purpose of yardstick competition is the redirectioning of an operator’s practices 
through the information obtained near other colleagues (average or best practices), 
which leads to an artificial form of competition among them (Marques, 2006). 
This method is much adopted in the scope of PCR. For example, in the UK, the 
BAA regulation carried out by the CAA has been based on yardstick competition 
(in  the  factor  X  computation).  Other  price  cap  regime  that  uses  yardstick 
procedures is Brussels (Belgium) and outside Europe, a noteworthy example is 
Macao  (China),  which  adopts  a  quasi-pure  yardstick  competition  regulatory 
method.   
 
                                                 
8 For example, last year Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) budget was almost 200 million Euros 
(CAA, 2007).                          10 
There are also hybrid methods where regulation leans on more than one of the 
regulatory methods mentioned above. It is common to find in the same regulatory 
period, among other combinations, regulation processes based on PCR and RoR. 
One of the most adopted is that where costs and profit sharing are defined ex ante. 
A profit sharing (or costs sharing) scheme often employed is the sliding scale 
method,  which  is  applied,  for  example,  in  the  regulation  of  Frankfurt  airport 
(Fraport). In this process there is a partition rule that divides the profit (or costs) 
excess between customers and the regulated utility that only allows the increase of 
rate  of  return  above  the  value  established  before  if  the  prices  are  reduced 
simultaneously.  
 
2.2.3 Regulatory methods in Europe 
Table 1 systematizes the regulatory methods used in the major airports of each 
country in the European Union (EU) in 2006.
9 In this table “no regulation” means 
that  the  charges  of  airports  are  determined  directly  and  opaquely  by  the 
Government.  However,  it  is  probable  that  most  of  them  employ  the  less 
incentivating RoR methods.  
 
Table 1 – Airport regulatory method employed in EU (25) countries in 2006 
Country  Regulatory 
method 
Country  Regulatory 
method 
Country  Regulatory 
method 
Austria  Non-pure price cap   Greece  No regulation  Poland  No regulation 
Belgium  Yardstick competition   Hungary  Pure price cap  Portugal  Rate of return  
Czech R.  No regulation  Ireland  Revenue cap   Slovak R.  No regulation 
Cyprus  No regulation  Italy  No regulation  Slovenia  No regulation 
Estonia  Rate of return   Latvia  No regulation  Spain  Rate of return  
Denmark  Pure price cap   Lithuania  No regulation  Sweden  Pure price cap  
Finland  No regulation  Luxembourg  Rate of return  UK  Pure price cap  
France  Revenue cap   Malta  Pure price cap      
Germany  Non-pure price and 
revenue cap and ROR 
Netherlands  Rate of return     




                                                 
9 Table 1 regards only the main airports. For example, in the UK it only reports to BAA and in 
France to Paris airports (ADP).                         11 
 
 
2.3 The scope of the regulation and single/dual till models 
Airports services are not like other monopolistic infrastructure services. If their 
aeronautical facilities (runway, apron and terminal), as a rule, work in a monopoly 
environment and even the aeronautical activities (ground handling, catering and 
fuelling)  have  competition  distortions  and  consequently  are  prone  to  abusive 
behavior, the non-aeronautical activities run at a commercial basis. Furthermore, 
commercial activities such as retail, catering and car parking represent a relevant 
component of airport revenues. So, if the profits from commercial activities are 
used to cross-subsidize aeronautical activities we are in presence of the single till 
regime. In the opposite circumstance the dual till scheme applies, where the two 
airport business branches are separated. Most countries, such as the UK (since 
1987), have traditionally applied the cross-subsidy (single till). Table 2 displays 
the single/dual till regulatory models in the EU. The single till approach is widely 
used and its main advantages are to minimize the airport charges and to keep with 
the international recommendations (e. g. International Civil Aviation Organization 
- ICAO). As major drawbacks one can point out the reduced incentive to improve 
commercial  activities,  the  flagging  of  the  airport  value,  the  forecasts  required 
about the future commercial revenues and the non-cost reflective charges (Smith, 
2002). Recently, the dual till approach has gained prominence in Europe. Indeed, 
despite producing higher airport charges for users and stand up cost allocation 
issues,  dual  till  regulation  makes  charges  reflect  costs  more  closely  and 
maximizes the airport value. Several studies have come out earnestly defending 
the dual till to the detriment of the single till regulation and, in our opinion, the 
arguments  make  sense,  at  least  under  certain  conditions  [(ACCC,  2001)  and 
(CAA,  2002)].  Beesley  and  Starkie  are  two  of  the  economists  who  attack  the 
single  till.  The  first  author  argues  that  regulation  should  focus  on  activities 
characterized by a natural monopoly (aeronautical activities) and that when there 
are commercial activities provided altogether it is impossible to separate them and 
consequently  the  application  of  price  cap  formulas  is  biased  (Beesley,  1999). 
Starkie  goes  farther  (Starkie,  2001).  He  even  neglects  the  need  for  economic                         12 
regulation for the non-congested airports, since the increased airports charges do 
not  only  reduce  the  demand  for  flights  but  also  the  demand  for  commercial 
activities,  and  therefore  the  return  of  airports.  Thus,  airports  do  not  have 
incentives to increase their rents. We reject these conclusions because the best rent 
of the monopolies, including airports, is the quiet life of Hicks and so without 
economic  regulation  we  are  encouraging  the  inefficiency-X  of  Leibenstein. 
Starkie defends, however, that for congested airports the application of a dual till 
scheme  would  lead  to  higher  aeronautical  charges  which  would  have  positive 
effects on the allocation of scarce slot capacity and on the investment incentives. 
These  arguments  are  corroborated  by  other  authors  (e.  g.  Oum  et  al.,  2004), 
although  others  stand  for  the  single-till  approach  as  welfare  maximizer  when 
compared with the dual till method at non-congested airports [(Czerny, 2006) and 
(Lu and Pagliari, 2004)].  
 
Table 2 – Single or dual till approach in the airport economic regulation in the EU (25) 
countries in 2006 
Country  Single/dual till  Country  Single/dual till  Country  Single/dual till 
Austria  Single till  Greece  Dual till  Poland  - 
Belgium  Single till  Hungary  Single till  Portugal  Single till 
Czech R.  -  Ireland  Single till  Slovak R.  - 
Cyprus  -  Italy  Dual till  Slovenia  - 
Estonia  -  Latvia  -  Spain  Single till 
Denmark  Dual till  Lithuania  -  Sweden  Single till 
Finland  -  Luxembourg  -  UK  Single till 
France  Single till  Malta  Dual till     
Germany  Dual/single till  Netherlands  Dual till     
 Sources: Various [(Gillen and Niemeier, 2006), ATRS, IATA and airports and regulators websites)] 
 
 
3. THE PROBLEMS OF AIRPORTS REGULATION 
One  of  the  main  functions  of  regulation  is  to  establish  airport  charges.  They 
include, among others, a levy on aircraft landing, on passengers’ departures, on 
passengers’ transfers and on aircraft parking. The regulator intends to define a 
fair, reasonable and equitable charge basket and to foster airports efficiency and 
innovation.  However,  “there  are  several  complexities  in  the  airport  pricing 
problem” (Forsyth, 1997) that should be accommodated in order to achieve the 
desired objectives.                         13 
As various studies show, many European airports are characterized by high levels 
of  productive  inefficiency  [(Gillen  and  Lall,  1997),  (Pels  et  al.,  2001)  and 
(Brochado and Marques, 2007)]. Benchmarking could be a good tool to provide 
incentives for performance improvement, but there is the serious possibility of 
comparing “apples with oranges”. The institutional and operational environment 
make  the  operating  expenses  (OPEX)  of  each  airport  change,  there  are 
transferences between capital expenses (CAPEX) and OPEX (and vice-versa) and 
the consensus over the most appropriate benchmarking technique is not peaceful 
(e.  g.  parametric  versus  non-parametric  methods)  since  each  one  of  them  has 
drawbacks.  Nevertheless,  the  mitigation  of  asymmetric  information  and, 
consequently, the promotion of transparency always justify the benchmarking use 
(Marques, 2006). Moreover, as the airport industry has shown, the absence of 
transparency and of clear-cut consultation processes in tariffs setting and in future 
investments have constrained the regulatory processes effectiveness. 
Airports are often congested as a result of inadequate investments made in the 
past and of feeble pricing regimes. Other times the airports display gold plating 
practices, highlighting an excess of capacity and luxurious facilities. Measuring 
the capital efficiency of airports is not an easy task (Holt et al., 2006). Another 
problem  related  to  the  capital  investments  is  the  availability  of  slots.  The 
monetary trading of slots in the EU is forbidden, being valid the grandfathering 
principle.  This  is  very  troublesome  and  harmful  to  competition  in  the  airport 
sector, emphasizing the importance of the historic flag  airline.  In the  EU flag 
airlines account for about 50 % of all traffic in each airport. Table 3 shows the 
importance of the dominant carrier at the chief airport in each EU country. A more 
efficient slot allocation would reduce the market power. Simultaneously, we have 
been observing the proliferation of low cost airline companies, a strong passenger 
and cargo growth, tighter security measures, the internalization of environmental 
costs and the upholding of the same privileged slots. Also, the subsidizing policy 
of  smaller  airports  is  not  always  the  clearest,  restraining  the  competition  and 
infringing the European Commission (EC) Treaty and the Competition Law. 
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Table 3 – Importance of flag airline in the main airport in each EU (25) countries in 
2004 
Country  Importance / 
airline 
Country  Importance / 
airline 
Country  Importance / 
airline 
Austria  59 %; Austrian Airlines  Greece  46 %;  Olympia  Poland  - 
Belgium  30 %; Brussels Airlines  Hungary  -  Portugal  - 
Czech R.  -  Ireland  31 %; Air Lingus  Slovak R.  - 
Cyprus  -  Italy  45 %; Air Italia  Slovenia  - 
Estonia  -  Latvia  -  Spain  57 %; Iberia 
Denmark  47 %; SAS  Lithuania  -  Sweden  43 %; SAS 
Finland  -  Luxembourg  -  UK  42 %; B. Airways 
France  58 %; Air France  Malta  -     
Germany  60 %; Fraport  Netherlands  51 %; KLM     
 Source: ATRS (2006) 
 
The inefficient structure of  charges is  also a relevant issue. The  general tariff 
regime  is  not  based  on  the  Ramsey  pricing  principle,  recommended  when  the 
airport is not congested. ICAO suggests the use of a weight based charge that 
could work as a quasi-Ramsey pricing (Niemeier, 2003). Some authors argue that 
the charges structure should be more focused on the passengers number, namely 
the variable component of the pricing system, since its change has consequences 
both in airside and in non-airside markets (Klenk, 2004). Besides, there is often no 
payment to use peak periods, fostering irrational investments. Depending on each 
airport  features,  single  till  or  dual  till  regimes  are  adopted  without  clear 
justification.  The  non-incentivating  American  RoR  also  continues  to  be  used, 
feeding the national champions of airport industry in several European countries 
(e.  g.  Spain,  Portugal  and  Finland).  The  same  happens  with  the  price  cap 
formulas,  often  misconceived,  which  do  not  provide  real  incentives  to  the 
productivity of airports nor do they defend the airports against the unexpected 
shocks  as  the  downturn  demand  when  September  11
th  happened.  As  a  NERA 
study points out, there is a huge difference in profits between airports and airlines 
(NERA,  2006).  Indeed,  the  market  power  and  the  absence  of  competition  in 
airport  industry  are  abnormal,  presenting  unacceptable  monopoly  rents  for  a 
service  of  general  economic  interest.  Those  national  champions  usually  have 
various  airports  with  some  of  them  (the  profitable  ones)  subsidizing  others,                         15 
sending  a  wrong  message  to  the  market  (e.g.  AENA  in  Spain  and  ANA  in 
Portugal). 
Finally the non-definition of levels of service in airport industry is harmful to this 
sector’s performance. Its features of general interest service (public service) do 
not allow for the provision of operating conditions without a minimum quality 
standard.  For  example,  availability  of  flight  information,  toilet  cleanliness  and 
wayfinding are some of the aspects to be account and to be periodically displayed 
and publicized through performance indicators by airports (or regulators). As a 
rule, airports do not attribute real responsibilities to the outsourced firms for a 
poorer  performance  presented  (for  example,  the  ground  handling  services). 
Airports  are  always  responsible  for  everything  that  takes  place  within  their 
premises, although particular activities may be provided by other entities. As we 
will discuss next, there should be obligations of public service well defined and 
supervised by independent regulatory authorities. These agencies in Europe are 
still  a  kind  of  UFO  (“Unidentified  Flying  Organism”)  protecting  the 
Governments’ interests rather than the public interest.       
 
4. IS THERE THE NEED FOR A EUROPEAN REGULATOR? 
The  EC  on  20  June  1997  developed  a  proposal  for  a  Directive  based  on  the 
principles of cost relatedness, transparency and non-discrimination. It aimed at a 
tighter relation between airport charges and the cost of service provided, greater 
transparency by means of compulsory consultation procedures between airports 
and the remaining stakeholders and the provision of non-discriminatory services 
in-between the State Members. The controversy between single/dual till was also 
pointed out. As expected, the proposal was rejected by the airports and also by 
some flag carriers close to the airports and to the Governments of each country, 
which generally own themselves a dominant position. The argument against the 
Directive was the subjection of airports to EC Competition Law (articles 81, 82 
and 86 of EC Treaty). Although some decisions had been taken in the scope of the 
European Court of Justice, some airlines continued to claim fair charges and more 
transparency  and  participation  in  that  decision  process.  For  example,  it  is 
desirable that an airline can discuss the need for new investments in the airport                         16 
that will be paid by the airline itself. A recent study (ACI, 2003) reviewed the 
different practices of airport economic regulation concerning the type of charges 
applied  at  airports  and  the  consultation  process  about  the  procedure  of 
determining  the  charges  and  the  planning  of  future  airport  investments.  It 
underlines the high complexity and diversity of the regulatory processes with very 
different  practices,  sometimes  incompatible  between  them  and  theoretically 
outdated.  
Considering the past failure and the ICAO’s recommendations (see ICAO, 2004) 
about the non-discrimination in charges application, the ensuring of transparency 
and consultation and the establishment and review of quality standards, the EC 
carried out a new proposal of a Directive on airport charges on 24 January 2007. It 
was  developed  bearing  in  mind  the  EU  principles  of  subsidiarity  and 
proportionality. The Directive was aimed at the fulfillment of seven goals, namely 
non-discrimination between carriers and passengers, existence of consultation and 
remedy,  provision  of  transparency,  ensuring  of  quality  standards,  fair 
differentiation of charges, establishment of security charges and implementation 
of  an  independent  regulatory  authority.  Naturally,  the  Directive  proposal  was 
highly controversial and refused by the airports, by some airline companies and 
also by some Governments. The approval of the Directive would unquestionably 
interfere with diverse interests rooted in society. Indeed, as higher is the noise 
about the Directive more are we convinced of the importance of its establishment.   
The proposal of a Community Act defining a general framework with a number of 
common principles that airport operators must consider when determining airport 
charges was selected through an impact assessment, among a set of four policy 
options.
10 One of these options concerned the introduction of a legal framework 
requiring the determination of airport charges on the base of a regulatory system 
uniformly applied across the EU and based on a single method of calculation. We 
believe that the implementation of such a European regulatory authority could 
have several advantages:  
                                                 
10 The four options considered by the EC are no action, self-regulation by the aviation industry, 
general EU framework of common principles and binding regulation.                         17 
·  The increase of transparency at airports reducing the traditional asymmetric 
information (e. g. about 80 % of the major European airports do not have the 
accounts and activities reports published in their websites); 
·  The possibility of decision making without political motivation avoiding the 
discrimination  and  obeying  a  thoroughly  consultant  process  either  for  the 
charges establishment or investments decision;   
·  The  identification  of  the  most  efficient,  innovative  and  with  higher  quality 
standards airports that are best practices and that can constitute benchmarks 
(peers) for other airports;  
·  The  creation  of  a  competitive  environment  among  airports,  leading  to  the 
sector’s improvement as a whole; 
·  The  analysis  of  the  market  structure  regarding  the  optimal  airport  size,  its 
ownership and mode of organization (e. g. corporatization). 
Nevertheless, the EC concluded that although this option was expected to have 
“the  strongest  impact  on  cost-efficiency  on  airports”  the  implementation  of  a 
European binding regulatory system would face several difficulties, as it would 
require  substantial  modification  on  the  accounting  systems,  and  considerable 
effort both for regulators and airports. Moreover, the EC recognizes that there is 
too  much  heterogeneity  across  EU  airports  to  include  them  into  the  same 
regulatory model. Instead of a binding regulatory system, the EC is proposing a 
set of binding principles that airports above a certain threshold must adhere (one 
million of passengers or twenty five million tones of annual cargo) when they 
determine  their  airport  charges.  While  a  number  of  significant  questions  still 
remain, we believe that the development of a Directive on Airport Charges EC 
proposal could be considered the first step in the right direction - towards efficient 
airport operations, as it recognizes that there is a problem that must be fixed.  
The Directive should be further accomplished by the creation of an Observatory 
for  the  EU  airports  with  the  task  of  collecting  and  sharing  data,  applying 
benchmarking  and  disseminating  best  practices  not  only  for  the  operation  and 
maintenance  and  infrastructure  construction  practices  but  also  for  the  reforms 
carried  out  by  European  airports.  It  could  be  a  source  of  technological                         18 
development in the airport industry. The Observatory would thus reduce the lack 
of  information,  enhance  transparency  and  support  the  creation  of  a  common 
vocabulary for the development of performance indicators. Thus, this intermediate 
solution between binding-principles and binding-regulation system might bring 
several benefits. The implementation of such an organization in a second step 
would allow airports to make the most of benchmarking application, a useful tool 
to  share  experiences,  knowledge  and  best  practices,  providing  clearness  and 
fairness to the regulatory processes and incentives to the airports efficiency and 
productivity. It would enable the comparison of the European best practices at a 
level  wider  than  the  national.  The  public  display  of  the  airports  performance 
results and their comparison with the remaining operators from the same sector, 
which is named sunshine regulation, produces very good results (Marques, 2006). 
The  awareness  of  airports  performance  is  obtained  by  pressure  of  different 
stakeholders. The option for the creation of a European Observatory would lead to 
the improvement of the quality of service of the sector as a whole, leading to the 
“value for money” spent in this service of general economic interest. At last, note 
that this European Observatory should be formed by elements representing the 
different stakeholders (e. g. airlines, users, operators and regulators) and should 
work lose to other European institutions. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Airports offer facilities and services related to the handling of aircrafts and to the 
processing  of  passengers  and  cargo  and  generally  recover  their  costs  through 
airport  charges.  For  the  European  airports,  in  view  of  the  current  limited 
competition  and  their  monopolistic  characteristics,  all  countries  have  adopted 
some degree of economic regulation. However, airport infrastructures across the 
EU are characterized by different charging models (e.g. RoR and PCR), charge 
components,  charge  structure  (recovery  of  external  costs,  subsidization  of 
aeronautical  costs  by  commercial  revenues,  cross-subsidization  in  network 
operated  airports)  and  charge  levels.  Owing  to  the  lack  of  transparency  and 
exchange of information between airports and airlines, airport charge levels are 
not always properly justified to airport users. This heterogeneity may also lead to 
a distortion of competition between airports. The EC recognized that there are                         19 
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￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿# ￿￿# ￿/ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿<￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿: ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    !￿
￿￿￿￿) ￿￿
? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ A ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿<￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    !￿
￿￿￿￿) 0 ￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& # ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿# ￿" # ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ # ￿& ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ A ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿? ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    !￿
￿￿￿￿)   ￿
￿ ￿ $ B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿<￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    !￿
￿￿￿￿, 3 ￿
+ ￿ $ ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ 9 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ + ￿C 5 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
’ ￿ + ￿C 3 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    !￿
￿￿￿￿, ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿# ￿" # ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿￿    !￿
￿￿￿￿, !￿
? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿<￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿<￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿￿    !￿
￿￿￿￿, ( ￿
1 ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿# ￿" # ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿/ # ￿" # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿
￿    !￿
￿￿￿￿, ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9 # ’ ￿’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿￿    !￿
￿￿￿￿, ) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿# ￿" # ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿, , ￿
+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ # ￿& ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿<￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
<￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
D ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿, ￿￿
D ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ # ￿& ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿, 0 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿￿# ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿,   ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿" ￿ 9 $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ # ￿ & ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿" ￿ 9 $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿" ￿ 9 $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿￿!￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ # ￿ & ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ A ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿$ ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿￿( ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ # ￿& ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ $ E ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ B ￿2 3 E 6 45 6 6 2 ￿B ￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿$ ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ # ￿ & ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿B ￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿$ ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿￿) ￿
/ ￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ 1 # ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ : ￿￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿1 ￿ ￿ < ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿￿, ￿
+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿
1 ￿ ￿ < ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ # ￿ & ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ F ￿ ￿ 4
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ; ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % & # ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿1 ￿ ￿ < ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿/ # ￿￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ G ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿H ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿1 ￿ ￿ < ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿￿  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / # ￿ 2 ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿1 ￿ ￿ < ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿0 3 ￿
> ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿B ￿1 ￿ ￿ < ￿￿    ( ￿
￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿> ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿. ￿ ￿ ￿￿: ￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿
<￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿B ￿1 ￿ ￿ < ￿￿    ( ￿
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￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿